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1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with a statistical analysis of the short- and long-term
income performance of corporations in Austrian industry. For this purpose time
series are constructed from aggregate balance sheet statistics which show the
effects of valuation practices and accounting conventions and various tax rules
on the calculation of various definitions of rates of return.
After a rather brief discussion of the concepts involved in "inflation accounting"
to arrive at ex-post real rates of return for the corporate industrial sector and
ten sub-sectors, which takes account of the historical emergence of the concepts
and their applicability to the present Austrian situation, various definitions of
"rates of return" are distinguished. The methodological part then traces the
construction of the Austrian data, thereby attempting to keep the various
relevant concepts apart.
The methodological section is followed by empirical analysis, describing the
sectoral structure of profitability and the long and short-term behavior of these
rates of return. Several hypotheses are tested as to their applicability to
Austrian profitability data. Bye-results of these efforts are the description of
capital structure (debt-equity ratios) and the effective tax burden borne by the
corporations. Finally, some evidence is presented on the Austrian stock market
in general and on divided payout ratios in particular. This latter section sheds
some light on the peculiarities of the Austrian capital market and its inability to
play an important role as a provider of risk capital. The section closes with a
short comparison of costs and yields of capital in Austria.
-3 -
The scope of the investigation is limited, insofar as it extends to industrial
corporations (joint stock companies, "Aktiengesellschaften") only. These are the
only enterprises required to publish balance sheets on an annual basis. These
balance sheets are aggregated by sector and published by the Central Statistical
Office with a time lag of approximately three years. Thus the present analysis
covers the time span 1956-1978. The sector under investigation is composed of
less than ZOO firms and employs slightly more than 40% of Austrian industrial
employees (see table 1). Since these corporations over-represent large firms (and
especially the basic industries such as mining, petroleum and steel), an extension
of the results to the total of Austrian industry is dangerous. Furthermore, there
is some, if only sparse, evidence that different size classes of firms exhibit
significantly different profitability rates1).
The data of the published balance sheet statistics form the core of the data base.
From it various estimates are carried out. This data set is supplemented by
published National Income Accounting (NIA) data, especially as concerns various
price indices. Capital stock data are semi-official estimates of the Austrian
Institute of Economic Research (Wifo), stock and capital market data are
published by the Austrian National Bank. The rest of the data stems from the
Wifo-Data-Bank.
Throughout this analysis the data presented are summations over firms, i.e.
transactions among the firms concerned are not netted out. Thus, the sectoral or
industry indebtedness ratios may be slightly over-stated, since it shows the
weighted sum of the individual firms' indebtedness rather than that of the
Number of Firms and Degree of Representation
of Industrial Corporations (1976)
Sector No. of Firms
Stone-Clay, Glass
Electrical Engineering
Machinery, 'Vehicles
Chemicals
Food-Tobacco
Iron, Steel, Metal Products
Mining, Petroleum
Paper
Wood Products
Leather, Textiles, Clothing
Total Industry
18
15
29
23
19
29
9
15
7
31
195
Representation1
26,14%
50,20%
35,88%
46,67%
25,66%
67,70%
80,14%
51,63%
3,53%
16,37%
41,13%
1) Number of employees of corporations within sector in relation
to number of employees in sector of total industry.
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consolitaded sector(s). On the other hand, in summing up losses of some firms are
netted out against profits of other firms. In this respect, the individual sector,
resp. total industry is treated like one single firm. The calculated rates of return
then correspond not the mean rates of the individual firms, but rather to their
weighted average.
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2. Methodology of Inflation Accounting
2.1 Capital Maintenance and Income Concepts
It has been a recurring experience of the past sixty years that sustained periods
of rising price levels led to discussions on how to measure business income
"correctly". The hyper-inflation of the twenties led to an extensive debate in
Germany (represented in the works of Schmalenbach and Schmidt) on capital
maintenance and income concepts; this debate was revived during the inflation
of the fifties, and the latest round of inflationary pressure since the early
seventies has resulted in a vast international literature on how to change
accounting rules in order to take account of changing price levels ("inflation
accounting"). This paper does not intend to add to the host of proposals made in
this direction, but intends to use an eclectic approach and adjust Austrian
corporation accounts ex-post, in order to obtain results on "real" profitability of
these corporations. As is common in the literature on inflation accounting, the
term "real" in connection with a ratio refers to the fact that the distorting
effects of historical cost accounting have been removed from the data, in the
numerator as well as the denominator, but that each component is still
calculated on a current price base. Thus, a "real rate of return" is the quotient of
(inflation-adjusted) profits (at current prices) and (inflation-adjusted) capital
stock (at current prices).
It should be recognized that all discussion on inflation accounting is (at least
implicitly) tied in with the discussion on capital maintenance concepts. The main
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problem in inflation accounting is how to adjust profit concepts in such a way
that the "substance" of the firms (sectors) is not endangered by too high tax
payments or dividend distribution which result from profit calculations based on
the accepted historical cost accounting concepts.
Basically all tax accounting and national income accounting rules agree that
profit should be defined as the surplus of revenue over cost after provision has
been made for maintaining the company's capital intact, i.e. after deducting
some definition of depreciation (SNA). It should be mentioned here that the
issues of inflation accounting also touch upon the question of the equity of the
tax burden. It has been argued that if business is allowed to substract from the
tax base a provision for keeping its productive capacity intact, the same should
apply to labor income (Welzmiler). Such a position would require two adjust-
ments to personal income: One the one hand a "reproduction" deduction (to
maintain the labor power and the wealth position of the individual), on the other
hand an indexation of the relevant deduction, in order to account for inflation.
From the equity point-of-view the above position seems justified. Our present
societies do not seem to share this view, however, since they allow depreciation
deductions and, a fortiori, inflation accounting only for business income.
The literature on inflation accounting distinguishes between three major capital
maintenance concepts (see e.g. Coenenberg-Macharzina, Schneider, Lawson,
Rosenfield, etc.):
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- Nominal capital maintenance: here the nominal (money) value of the invested
capital has to be recouped before income (profit) arises. This definition lies at
the basis of the present (historic cost) accounting rules in most countries.
- Real capital maintenance: the real (constant cost) value of the capital invested
shall be maintained. Thus profit is the surplus after provision has been made for
a) the loss in purchasing power of the money unit (current purchasing power
accounting: CPP), or alternatively b) for the increase in the prices of the inputs
into the production process (current cost accounting:CCAZ). According to the
method chosen assets are revalued either by a single price index (GNP-deflator
or consumer price index - CPP method), or by asset-specific price indices
(replacement costs of assets - CCA method).
- Economic capital maintenance: under this concept profit arises only after
provision has been made for deducting all costs which secure the reproduction of
the economic value of the firms, i.e. the present value of the future income
streams. These is a long discussion in the literature3) on how to make this
concept operational, which is orientated into the future. Most authors agree that
this concept is the most desirable one theoretically, since economic theory
defines economic profit not as the result of past activities, but rather as the
income stream generated in the future by an investment undertaken now.
For the purpose of the present study it was decided to follow this latter concept
and approach it by applying the proposals made by Kennedy and Godley-Cripps.
They consider the productive potential of the firms maintained when provision
has been made for the replacement of firstly machinery, equipment and plant,
secondly of inventories, and thirdly of net liquid assets necessary to carry on the
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business (going concern assumption). This method still implies a rather static
income concept. Some authors (and business interests) would like to also include
into capital maintenance provisions for necessary technological change.
Any consistent capital maintenance concept necessitates some inflation adjust-
ments to historic cost accounts. Each capital maintenance concept will result in
a different inflation accounting method and thus in a different definition and
concept of profit. There is no generally "correct" way of calculating profit.
Different purposes require different adjustment concepts. The objective of this
paper leads the author to decide in favor of current cost accounting which
"guarantees" the replacement of all those assets which the firms need to carry
on their business. This method has the additional advantage that revenues and
costs then are measured at the same (=current) prices, in contrast to present
historic cost calculations where revenues are measured at current prices, but
costs are measured at a conglomerate of past prices of varying periods. Thus
current cost accounting yields a profit estimate which uses the same deflator for
revenues and costs.
The objective of this study, to estimate the past economic income performance
of the Austrian corporate industry sector, requires the calculation of current
cost (="real") profit and real rates of return, net of depreciation. Other
objectives, e.g. the analysis of the firms' income distribution, or a comparison
with alternative money rates of interest may not require an inflation adjustment.
For such purposes book profits based on historic cost accounting are appropria-
te4). A similar argument applies to the decision wether to measure profit on
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total capital (entity view) or on equity only (proprietary view). Both are possible,
but a decision between them is not a question of faith, but rather depends on the
objective of the investigation. In this present study emphasis is on total profit
(entity view), since we are interested in the performance of the corporate sector
as a whole, no matter where the funds for investment come from. Equity rates of
return are analyzed only as a subsidiary question (differences in these two
concepts point to transfers between the two types of financiers; these transfers
in general benefit equity owners at the expense of creditors when prices rise).
2.2 Cash Flow Method
In several articles the present author has presented a cash-flow concept for the
estimation of industry profits5). In these previous studies no explicit attempt was
made to take account of inflation problems. This extension is the topic of this
present paper (Table Z). According to this cash flow approach gross book profit is
calculated as the sum of accounting profit (minus losses) plus direct taxes on
corporate income and property plus net change in reserves of all kinds (excluding
"revaluation reserve") plus net interest payable plus book depreciation. Subtrac-
tion of "economic depreciation" calculated at historic cost yields net book profit
(HC).
When "fictitious profits" which represent the adjustments required to maintain
fixed assets and inventories and net monetary assets are subtracted, current cost
net operating surplus (CC) results which corresponds to the above economic
capital maintenance concept.
Table z
Cash Flow Acoroach to Profits Calculation
+ Net AccountingProfit (adjusted for carry-overs.from previous year)
- AccountingLosses
+ Direct Taxes on Corporate Income and Property
+ Change in Reserves of All Kinds (net of "revaluation reserve")
+ Net Interest Payments
+ Book Depreciation
GROSS BOOK PROFIT (HC)
- "Economic Depreciation" (calculated from book values)
NET BOOK PROFIT (HC)
- Fictitious Profits from Fixed Assets
- Inventory Valuation Adjustment
Fictitious Profits (net of Losses) from Monetary Assets
NET OPERATING SURPLUS (CC)
- Net Additions to "Social Capital"
- Interest Paid on Monetary Liabilities
+ "Geared" Proportion of Fictitious Profits
EQUITY PROFIT (CC)
HC: based on historic cost valuation (book valuation)
CC: based on current cost valuation
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To arrive at current cost equity profit (proprietary profit), net additions to
"social capital" and interest paid on monetary liabilities must be subtracted and
the "geared" portion of fictitious profits must be added back in, since by
definition fictitious profits can only be subtracted for that part of assets which
is equity-financed. If the remaining fictitious profits are added in, total
proprietary gain (HC) results which can be used for the calculation of earnings
yields.
The method of calculation proposed here combines the advantages of adding in
with accounting profit those elements which represent revenues without cash
transactions and deducting an equivalent cost concept, plus being able to
accomodate the necessary inflation adjustments in order to arrive at "real"
operating surplus (CC). These estimates have been shown to be well suited to
approximate economic profit (Bayer 1980b).
2.3 Inflation Adjustment to "Capital"
Each of the profit concepts in section 2.2 is related to a specific capital concept.
In addition, the estimates of the inflationary elements of book profit ("fictitious
profits") stem from a re-estimation of the asset values at current costs.
Basically, three types of adjustments to the book figures are required.
According to Austrian accounting rules fixed assets are valued at historic costs.
In order to arrive at a measure of fixed assets valued at replacement cost
(current costs), a new capital stock for Austrian corporate industrial enterprises
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was calculated on the basis of the "perpetual inventory" method (Goldsmith). The
estimates and methodology are described elsewhere6). For the calculation of net
capital stock in real terms a degressive method of calculating economic
depreciation was applied, in which the rate of depreciation is approximately
equal to twice the linear rate. There is a long discussion in the literature on what
type of depreciation formula to use in such estimates7). Here a degressive
formula is applied because there is evidence that it corresponds most closely to
actual firm behavior in Austria. Several authors describe the differences in
profit estimates resulting from various depreciation methods8). These
differences have to be kept in mind when the results are interpreted. For lack of
additional information the sectoral capital stocks were calculated by applying
the industry depreciation rate to all sectors. Real net capital stock estimates
then were inflated by means of price indices for fixed capital formation, i.e. the
index for machinery and equipment and the index for plant, such that current
cost estimates resulted. These estimates differ from the book values in two
respects:
- they contain the "hidden reserves" which result from the quicker write-off
through accelerated depreciation schemes permitted in Austria and the effects
of the shorter service lives permitted in the calculation of "normal" depreciation
for tax purposes (cumulative difference between book depreciation allowances
and "economic" depreciation) and
- they contain the effect of valuation at replacement costs. The latter effect is
smaller than the former, even though at times of high inflation (especially 1974)
the latter reaches sizable proportions.
- 12 -
For the purpose of revaluing stocks of inventories very rough estimates had to be
carried out. Basically, Austrian firms are required to value their stocks by the
"identity pricing method". This, however, is only possible for such commodities
which are distinguishable from each other and where the movement into and out
of the stock can therefore be recorded. A vast number of commodities (fuel, raw
materials, many semi-manufactured goods) are indistinguishable. These commo-
dities may be valued at various methods of average pricing, which corr.espond
closely to those suggested by the SNA procedures. There is no information in
Austria on which procedures are applied to what extent in practice. Further-
more, according to Austrian rules synthetic methods like LIFO or FIFO, are not
permitted. Thus it proved difficult to arrive at realistic estimates of "real"
inventory changes. The decision was made to adjust the net input inventory
changes by half the value of the increase in the price index for industry inputs,
those of finished goods stocks by the industrial output price index. Among
several variants tested this measure afforded the most plausible inventory
changes when compared with sales, production and anticipation data. This
adjustment yields "fictitious" profit elements (inventory valuation adjustment)
which remain fairly stable throughout the first part of the period, but rise to
sizable magnitudes during the early seventies. Nevertheless, in relation to the
U.K. and the U.S. (where in 1974 this adjustment amounted to 48%, resp. 40% of
gross operating surplus) the average-pricing procedures resp. the above
assumptions keep this adjustment on a smaller level (in 1974: 20% of book
profits). Basically, this concept implies that actual valuation procedures of
Austrian firms eliminate about 1/2 of the price effect from inventory valuation,
thus only the rest enters the arguments of inflation accounting.
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The third "capital" item which requires adjustment is net monetary assets,
defined as those liquid net assets which are part of the companies' working
capital. They contain liquid assets and trade debtors minus debt creditors and are
considered essential to the firms' ability of staying in business (Hill, p.122). At
times they can assume negative values. If these net assets are considered
necessary for carrying on the business, their real value must be maintained. Thus
an adjustment is made to the effect that their net change between two years is
split into a real component as an inflation-induced component which is part of
"fictitious" profits and substracted from book profit. In general, this item is
relatively small from the quantitative point of view, but takes on significance
from the point of view of the logic of inflation accounting.
In principle there are two ways to take account of inflation adjustments in the
assets estimates: either "fictitious profit" elements are calculated from book
figures by means of the methods described, and these profit elements cumulated
and transferred into a "revaluation reserve" or "capital maintenance" fund.
Alternatively, each capital item is recalculated in terms of current costs. In this
case no other adjustment to the capital figures, from which the profit figures
are derived, is necessary.
The Austrian data situation calls for a mixture between these two methods: fixed
assets are recalculated from outside sources, inventory and net monetary assets
adjustments, on the other hand are approximated from book figures and
transferred to a reserve fund. Thus new series for physical capital, total capital,
and also equity capital (total capital minus book debts) at current costs are
-14-
developed and set in relation to the respective profit estimates, in order to
arrive at real rates of return series.
Other capital items, e.g. financial assets and other parts of working capital, are
not adjusted for inflationary bias, since they are assumed to represent non-
essential (for the carrying-on of the business) investments which do not warrant
capital maintenance provisions. They enter the capital estimates with their book
values. Table 3 shows the three elements of "fictitious profits" as calculated for
Austrian industrial corporations.
2.4 Physical Capital and Total Capital
The calculations and estimates in this paper refer primarily to "total capital",
i.e. to all assets recorded in the balance sheets. Thus rates of return also include
gains from extra-business activities, such as sale of equipment, interest on
financial assets or from arbitrary valuation practices, etc. So-called extra-
ordinary gains therefore are included in the profits estimates. As an alternative,
one could imagine, as does Austrian National Income Accounting, that such
activities and their proceeds should be excluded from these estimates, since they
refer to non-industrial activities. To make these effects visible we also calcula-
ted rates of return o physical assets only. This implies excluding extra-ordinary
gains from profits, excluding all financial interest-bearing assets from the
capital figure and also excluding (for the same reason) from the calculations all
adjustments to net monetary assets.
Table 3
"Fictitious Profit" Elements
Fixed Assets
342
374
537
601
688
822
887
1.046
1.064
1 .238
1 .291
1 .305
1.203
1.498
1. 726
2.034
2.522
2.366
3.161
3.906
3.652
3.328
3.139
2 .863
Inventories
in Mill.
200
303
130
- 135
- 26
14o
145
15
38
70
136
93
53
- 25
152
563
556
379
473
4.201
1.249
513
807
136
Net Monetary Assets
S
18
33
13
9
20
27
54
8
31
93
216
72
170
153
176
275
261
387
527
452
320
412
416
134
Sum
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
56o
T10
68o
475
682
989
1.086
1.069
1 .133
1 .401
1.643
1 .470
1.426
1 .626
2.054
2. 872
3.339
3.132
4.161
8.559
5.221
4.253
4. 362
3.133
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Z.5 Total Capital and Equity Capital
As mentioned above, the primary purpose here is to estimate rates of return on
all capital invested by the corporations, i.e. on equity plus debt. In this entity
view of the corporations the gains accruing to the equity owners through the fall
in the real value of the nominal debt in times of inflation is compensated by the
equivalent loss to the creditors. When returns on equity alone are calculated,
however, this income transfer from creditors to capital owners plays an
important role, as the calculations show. Comparisons between rates of return on
total capital and on equity exhibit these transfers.
In Austria there is a lot of discussion on whether to classify some capital
components which in general go by the name of "social capital" as equity or debt.
This term refers mainly to superannuation reserves, severance pay reserves,
pension reserves and other provisions of a "social" character, additions to which
are (to a varying extent) tax-free. Legally, in Austria some of these reserves are
classed equity, some debt, even though they are very similar in character. Most
of the social capital is ear-marked for the benefit of employees. Up to 1978
additions to social capital were tax-free practically without limit, since then
tax-free net additions, and also the total amount of social capital have been
limited. Up to that year provisions for "social capital" increased significantly
from year to year, because they enabled firms to reduce their tax burden. If
these provisions do not add to the equity owner's income in many cases, they
certainly increase the firms' liquidity. Especially those parts of social capital
which with high certainty are of a long-range character can be reinvested by the
firms and/or represent at least an interest-free loan.
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In order to take account of the increasing importance of "social capital" and also
of the difficulty of classing it as equity or debt, in this paper equity capital is
defined once as including social capital, the other time as excluding it. The data
situation does not allow a clear definition of "social capital" for all years
investigated, but gaps were filled by estimates.
Fi-gure 1
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3. Empirical Analysis
3.1 Sectoral Structure
The sectoral structure of the calculated rates of return is very sensitive to
definitional differences, especially to whether inflation accounting has been
applied or not. Table gives an overview of this structure according to various
definitions. For our main result, the real rate of return on total capital, the
ranking shows above-average rates (over the total period) for the stone and clay
industry, machinery and vehicles, the chemical industry, electrical engineering
and foodstuffs, and below-average rates for mining and petroleum (!, iron &
steel, paper and textiles and clothing. The major remarkable result in this
ranking is that of the mining and petroleum sector where the rates seem lower
than expected. Several factors account for that: on the one hand, the very
profitable petroleum sector is lumped together with the traditionally ailing coal
and ore mining industries, on the other hand inflation accounting has by far the
strongest effect on this sector, because it is extremely capital-intensive and
because also inventory-valuation adjustments (oil reserves) are very high. This is
presents a problem, because the Austrian oil industry does not only refine the
crude oil which it extracts itself, but imports the major share. The problem of
increasing prices of crude oil imports thus is not completely equivalent for the
petroleum industry as that of rising inventory costs in other sectors, since the
Austrian oil industry also has a major influence on influencing the prices of its
inputs. In addition, part of the revenues of the (nationalized) oil industry stem
not from production, but from trading activities, to which in the
Figure 2
EMITY RATES OF RETURN
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---- EQUITY ROR II AFTER TAXES
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Table 4
Sectoral Structure of Rates of Return
(Average ROR 1956-78 in Percent)
Net Rates of Return on
Physical
HC
Capital 1
CC
Total Capital
HC CC
Equity 1
HC CC
Stone & Clay,
Glass
Electrical
Engineering
Machinery,
Vehicles
Chemicals
Food Tobacco
Iron, Steel,
Metal Prod.
Mining,
Petroleum
Paper
Wood Products
Leather, Textiles,
Clothing
16,1
13,3
13,2
13,6
-12,6
10,2
15,3
9,4
11,4
6,6
10,7
9,6
9,2
8,7
8,1
6,2
6,0
5,8
5,5
3,4
13,1
8,9
9,8
10,0
12,9
8,3
8,6
9,1
7,0
8,0
6,9
6,4
5,9
5,5
5,7
3,6
16,5 11,0
16,3 11,7
18,8 14,1
14,5 9,0
13,5 8,7
11,8 7,2
16,6 7,1
11,4 7,0
12,7 7,7
7,5 4,4
16,4 10,9
16,1 11,3
18,9 14,1
13,9 8,9
13,0 8,3
11,2 6,7
16,2 6,7
11,2 6,9
12,0 7,6
7,4 4,3
Total Industry 12,0 7,2 9,4 6,1 13,9 8,3 13,5 7,9
Equity 1: invlusive "Social Capital"
Equity 2: exclusive "Social Capital"
1) 1956-77 only
Sector Equity 2
HC CC
8,11
Figure 3
ECTRAL MET REAL RATES OF RETURN
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opinion of this author the rationale and concepts of inflation accounting cannot
be applied in the same way as to production activities.
The ranking in terms of real equity rates of return is very similar to that of total
capital, only for the chemical industry is there a rank difference of more than
one (two). The equity rates are on average higher for all sectors, showing the
effect of positive leverage. This effect is highest for the machinery and vehicles
and the electrical engineering sectors and lowest for the mining and petroleum
and the leather, textiles, clothing sectors. The size of the leverage factor is
positively correlated with the size of the debt-equity ratio. The only significant
exception is the foodstuff industry which in spite of the second-lowest
debt-equity ratio exhibits an above-average leverage effect. It is likely that
because of this low debt-equity ratio (which also remained constant over time)
the firms in this sector were able to obtain very favorable credit conditions
which led to low interest rates on debt. But these firms did not attempt to
maximize their equity rates of return by increasing their debt-equity ratios. An
explanation for this can be found in the ownership structure of this highly
concentrated sector (nationalized industry and traditionally strong family
ownership).
3.2 Short and Long-Run Behavior: Testing Three Causal Hypotheses
A host of literature deals with explanations about the short and long-run
behavior of rates of return. In this paper three alternative hypotheses of
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so-called "crisis theory" are tested as to their applicability to Autrian data (see
Weisskopf 1980). Each of these hypotheses posits a different reason for the
initial fall in the rate of return which in turn leads to a reduction in investment
and output and thus to a crisis. Each of these hypotheses can be formulated
either as a long-run or a short-run theory, explaining either the trend in the rate
of return or its cyclical behavior:
The theory concerned with technological change and the "rising organic composi-
tion of capital" maintains that the capitalist process of accumulation sooner or
later generates an increase in the organic composition of capital (approximated
here by the capital-output ratio) which is caused by changes in the relative
prices of labor and capital. By means of a falling capital productivity this leads
to a fall in the rate of return.
Another hypothesis maintains that a major reason for the fall in the rate of
return can be found in the struggle over distribution exacerbated by the rising
strenght of labor. According to this view the long phase of prosperity after World
War II resulted (among others) in a strengthening of the position of labor and its
representatives which then led to a rise in the wage share at the expense of the
profit share. The short-run version of this hypothesis is based on the notion of a
periodic depletion of labor market reserves which strengthens labor's bargaining
position: if wages rise faster than productivity, and if this increase in unit labor
costs cannot fully be passed on into prices, the wage share will increase and thus
lead to a fall in the profit share and also (at constant utilization rates and
capital-output ratio) of the profit rate. Sometimes it is argued that the pressure
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of international competition additionally prevents wage increases from beeing
passed on in output prices.
The third version tested here refers to the so-called "realization problem". It
maintains that in the course of accumulation imbalances arise which make it
impossible to sell all the goods produced at profitable prices, since there is a
lack in effective demand. There are versions of "underconsumption" (Marx,
Baran-Sweezy) and of "underinvestment" (Kalecki, Steindl) in the literature as
the causes of this lack of effective demand. Reductions in production then lead
to under-utilization of existing capacity and thus to a fall in the profit rates.
In order to test these three hypotheses the net rate of return is decomposed into
three parts: the profit share, capacity utilization and the capacity-capital ratio
(the inverse of the capital-output ratio at full capacity).
P P Y H(1) r= K = . . = a.b.c
where P is defined as inflation-adjusted operating surplus, K as net capital stock,
Y as net output (approximated by the sum of profits and wages) and H as
capacity output.
The change in each of these three components then can be aligned with one of
the three hypotheses mentioned above. Thus the contribution of the change of
each component (hypothesis) to the change in the rate of return can be
determined. For the short-run analysis the total period was diveded into business
Figure 4
OUTPUT AND PROFITABILITY
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cycles (Figure 4). The boom phase of each cycle is further diveded into an early
(A) and a late (B) phase, in order to show the special role of the changes in the
rate of return.
Over the whole period (1956-1977) this analysis shows that the rate of return
falls on average by 5,4% p.a. At the same time the profit share decreased by
4,0%, while the capacity-capital ratio rose on average by 1,3% and -capacity
utilization by 0,04% p.a. (table 5)9).
The empirical tests show that in the short-as well as in the long run changes in
the wage share exert the strongest influence on the rate of return. In the long
run, about 80% of the fall in the rate of return is contributed by an increase in
the wage share. Over the total period the long-run increase in the capital-output
ratio also exerts a certain negative influence on the rate of return, but this
effect amounts only to about 1/3 of that of the wage share. Long-run changes in
capacity utilization (a slight long-run increase) are hardly of importance for
changes in the rate of return.
Between the three discernible cycles (1958-1961, 1961-1968, 1968-1977) the
rates of return also fell (table 6). During the fifties-sixties cycles only about
60% of the fall are accounted for by the rising wage share, while between the
sixties and seventies this contribution was roughly 90%. Between the fifties and
sixties the increasing capitalization of Austrian industry contributed around 30%
to the fall in the rate of return, while this contribution was around 45% in the
latter phase. The major difference between these periods lies in the effect of
Table 5
Values of Basic Variables:
Cycle and Full Period Averages
Cycles
I
Rate of Return, r
Profit share, a
Utilization, b
8,6
36,6
90,6
5,8
28,9
87,0
Full Period
III
4,9
24,9
91,9
6,0
28,8
90,0
Capital Productivity, c 21,0 22,625,7 22,8
Table 6
Average Annual Gronth Rates Between Cycles
Rate of Return, r
Profit share,, a
Utilization, b
I- II
- 8,1
- 4,8
- 0,8
II - III
- 2,2
- 2,0
+ 0,7
Capital Productivity, c
Full Period
- 5,~4
- 4,0
+ 0,1
- 1,3- 2,4 - 1,0
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capacity utilization which between the fifties and sixties a significant positive
effect on the rate of return.
Within the business cycle the following pattern emerges:
During the early boom phase (phase A) when the rate of return increases, more
than 2/3 of this increase is due to a rising profit share; increasing capital
productivity accounts for 20% of the increase in the profit rate, the rest is
contributed by improved capacity utilization. During late expansion (phase B),
production and capacity, utilization still increase, but a falling profit share and
falling capital productivity (due to still high rates of capital accumulation)
account for a slow fall in the rate of return. During the contraction phase of the
cycle of rapid fall in the rate of return is caused by a quickly rising wage share,
falling capital productivity and falling capacity utilization (table 7).
These tests show that the distribution parameter (profit share) and thus the
hypothesis of the struggle over income distribution exert the strongest influence
on the rate of return in Austrian industry. The theory of the rise in the organic
composition of capital receives far less support. No evidence can be found for a
theory based on realization failures. It should be noted, however, that these tests
can only be considered first steps in the causal explanation of long and short-run
changes in the rates of return.
Table 8 shows trend and cyclical behavior for several definitions of rates of
return for all industrial corporations. These equations just represent a way of
presenting the data in an organized way and do not attept to estimate causal
Table 7
Average Growth Rates During Cyclical Phases
A
Rate of Return, r
Profit share, a
Utilization, b
19,6
13,8
1,8
3,9
- 7,6
- 6,1
- 25,6
- 18,4
- 1,0
Capital Productivity, c
C
- 2,3 - 7,8
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relationships. Contrary to other countries, for Austria the inclusion of a cyclical
variable (full employment gap) increases both the size and the significance of the
trend term in all equations tested (table 8). The reason for this is that in Austria
capacity utilization in the early seventies was significantly higher than for any
period after the war. Thus it can be assumed on statistical evidence, that the fall
in the real rate of return over time, and especially since the 1974/75 recession in
Austria is part of a long-term phenomenon and not just a temporary effect of
lower capacity utilization in the seventies as has been maintained for the U.S.
(Holland-Myers) and Great Britain (King).
These results make it clear, however, that changes in depreciation and taxation
rules have eased the fall in the pre-tax rates significantly, in other words, the
effective burden of taxation on company profits has decreased significantly over
time. The results also show that the inclusion of financial assets into the rate of
return calculations reduce the fall in the rates, implying that returns on financial
assets have fared better during this period than those on real assets. The basic
long-term pattern of the real rates during the past 25 years can also be
presented by dividing the total period into five sub-periods which cover similar
cyclical developments: they range from the first year after a recession to the
next recession year. (Table 9).
For total industry the rates fall during the first three periods (1956-58, 1959-63,
1964-68) recover during the late sixties and early seventies (1969-75) and reach
their lowest level in the three years after 1975.
Long-Term Behavior of Different Rates of Return
for Total Industrv
Dependent Variable
.Regression
Time Trend
Coefficients
1 ) 2)
Cyclical Variable
Standard
Error
Gross RoR,
Capital HC
Net RoR, P
Cap., CC
Net RoR, T
Net RoR,
RoR, Equity,
RoR, Equity,
Physical
hysical
otal Cap. ,CC
Total Cap.,
CC
HC
,18
(90)
,11
(123)
' ,34
(20)
- ,37
(14)
,23
(20)
,26
(15)
,06
,36
,58
,77
,56
'73
,33
,61
,66
(34)
'33
(20)
,21
(30)
,21
(28)
,37
(26)
,40
(25)
CC - ,13
(33)
-,15
(23)
- 28
(27)
,31
(18)
- 24
(34)
,28
(22)
4,43
3,74
1,84
1,39
1, 31
1,06
1,21
,95
,43 2,04
,69 1,54
,31 2,22
,63 1,68
1) The regression equations were:
RoR = a + b(t) + c(GAP)
where GAP is an indicator of capacity utilization calculated as the
percentage of net industrial output (at constant prices) to potential
output
Table 9
Behavior Over Time of Sectoral Real Net Rates of
Return on Total Capital
Sector 1956-58 1959-63 1964-68 1969-75 1976-73
Stone & Clay, Glass 13,4 11,9 8,9 7,6 4,2
Electrical Engin. 7,4 8,4 4,1 8,1 6,4
Machinery, Vehicles 11,6 10,1 6,7 6,1 T,3
Chemicals 11,6 9,2 6,1 5,9 2,1
Food, Tobacco 8,8 9,0 7,1 4,1 3,7
Iron , Steel,
Metal Prod. 7,5 7,7 4,3 4,8 2,7
Mining-Petroleum 6,9 6,9 5,1 5,5 5,1
Paper 8,5 6,8 4,9 4,0 4,5
Wood Products 9,7 11,1 6,0 2,4 - 0,2
Leather, Textiles,
Clothing 5,0 4,4 2,8 3,8 -1,7
8,3 8,0 5,3Total Industry 5,4
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Most sectors follow this pattern quite closely. Major exceptions are the stone &
clay sector and the chemical industries which both exhibit continuously falling
rates, and the paper and machinery sectors which both show falling rates until
the 1974/75 recession, but a significant recovery afterwards.
The hierarchy of rates across sectors is relatively stable over time (Table 10):
significant deviations are revealed by the stone & clay sector which in 1976/78
falls to fifth rank, chemical industry which fell to eighth rank during this period.
On the other hand, the mining-petroleum sector improved its position throughout
the total period (from ninth place in the late fifties to third place 1976/78),
electrical engineering moved up from below-average rates until the late sixties
into the top ranks during the past ten years, and the paper industry which also
shows strong gains. The other sectors show now discernible trend, apart from the
wood products industry which because of the small sample size exhibits a very
unstable behavior.
All sectors show very strong cyclical fluctuations in their respective rates of
return. For total industry, the cyclical influence on the rates of return was
shown to be stronger than the long-term factors. In some sectors the sectoral
cyclical movement deviates from that of total industry, and there the specific
patterns dominate the general pattern. An example is the stone & clay industry,
and the foodstuff industry which for various reasons exhibit strong specific
cycles. It is quite surprising that neither the total industry average nor the
majority of the sectors (only exceptions: mining & petroleum and iron, steel,
metals) reach their low point at the time of the severest recession in post-war
history, i.e. in 1975: machinery and electrical engineering show their lowest real
rates in 1974, all other sectors in 1977. (Figure 4)
Table 10
Cranges in Sactoral RoR-Structure Over Time
(Ranking for Respective Period)
Sector 1956-58 1959-63 1964-68 1969-75 1976-78
Stone & Clay, Glass 1 1 1 2 5
Electrical Engin. 8 6 9 1 2
Machinery, Vehicles 2 3 3 3 1
Chemicals 3 4 4 4 8
Food-Tobacco 5 5 2 7 6
Iron, Steel,
Metal Products 7 7 8 6 7
Mining-Petroleum 9 8 6 5 3
Paper 6 9 7 8 4
Wood Products 4 2 5 10 10
Leather, Textiles,
Clothing 10 10 10 9 9
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3.3 Effective Tax Rates
It has been noted above that direct taxes paid (on income, revenue and assets) by
companies in relation to real profits (effective tax rates) vary quite significantly
over time and between sectors. Even though legal tax rates have not changed
very much during that time, depreciation allowances have been changed and
other tax-related rules varied. For industry as a whole tax rates increased as a
percentage of pre-tax profits during the fifties and sixties, then fell significantly
during the seventies. For Austria, the year 1968 ("Wachtumsgesetze" - "Growth
Acts") marks a significant turnaround in the taxation of company income. As a
result of the profit squeeze during the recession 1967/68 which made apparent
the effect of increased international competition in the face of an industry
structure which relied heavily on basic goods and had disadvantages in the
production of final goods, the government introduced a series- of laws designed to
facilitate structural adjustments of Austrian industry. As a result, among other
effects, effective tax rates fell significantly. During the later years, a series of
additional measures (especially changes in depreciation allowances) was taken to
increase these effects. Thus, as a result the effective tax rate for industry as a
whole during 1976/78 amounted to 29%, in contrast to the period of 1964-74
when it reached 48%. (Table 11)
Since taxes paid are not only the result of statutory tax rates and taxable
profits, but also depend on capital intensity, location, and various other effects,
effective tax rates differ from sector to sector and company to company. In
general, above average tax rates were levied on mining & petroleum, paper,
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES
.6 .6 j %A J- = -d
Effective Tax Rates1) Over Time
1956-58 1959-63 1964-68 1969-75 1976-78
Stone & Clay,
Glass
Electrical
Engineering
Machinery,
Vehicles
Chemicals
Food, Tobacco
Iron, Steel,
Metal Products
Mining, Petroleum
Paper
Wood Products
Leather, Textiles,
Clothing
37,5
28,6
48,9
35,0
33,5
29,9
32,2
31,4
34,1
38,5
36,0 32,1
28,8 56,4
51,8 52,2
34,2 51,0
47,2 28,5
38,5 42,3
39,0 63,3
35,6 43,4
42,3 41,5
44,0 39,9
Total Industry 34, 4 38,8 47,9
1) Direct taxes actually paid by companies in relation to pre-tax
net operating surplus (CC)
2) negative operating surplus
sector 1956-78
34,0
25,7
33,6
27,4
74,5
74,1
44,5
79,5'
30,3
31,3
54,4
23,2
20,0
39,8
27,9
31,6
_ 2)
_ 2)
37,1
33,1
41,8
36,6
65,8
47,7
44,1
47,9
30,8
9,9
33, 1 28,8 37,2
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foodstuffs and machinery. In all sectors with the exception of stone & clay a
similar time pattern to that of total industry is apparent, insofar as since the
late 1960s effective tax rates have declined significantly. This trend pattern is
even more significant when one remembers that for tax purposes inflation
accounting is not permitted by Austrian law. Thus effective tax rates fall even
more when applied to a book tax base (gross book profits) and not to a "real"
base.
3.4 Capital Costs and Returns
3.4.1 The Hopeless Case of The Austrian Stock Market
In Austria only 41 industrial firms (57 all together) are listed at the stock
exchange. The nominal value of all outstanding stock is 6,3 bill.S, their market
value 13,6 bill.S (1978). The relative size of the stock market can be measured by
setting the market value of the stocks in relation to the value added of the
respective sector: For Austrian industry this index in 1978 amounted to 7,6%, for
the whole economy to only 3,3%. Economy-wide figures for other countries are:
Germany 10%, Italy 8%, France 11%, Great Britain 21%, Japan 25%, USA 37%
(Bierich). This comparison shows already the limited size of the Austrian market.
In addition to that, in Austria only a small percentage of shares is traded
regularly (less than 1/4 is traded on more than 80% of trading days). Furthermore
Austrian commercial bank occupy the "right to self-entry", by which they are
allowed to take shares of their customers which are to be sold into their own
portfolios. This right has been estimated to occupy between 50% to 60% of all
sales, which further limits the size of the market.
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Approximately 80% of all shares which are theoretically up for trade are owned
by the government (nationalized industries), by nationalized banks or by families,
all of whom do not trade their shares, but rather hold on to them. Thus only
around 20% of the already small volume is open for trade. Under these historical
and institutional circumstances it is hardly surprising that no actual "market" for
shares develops and that the financing of companies via the capital market
remains on a very low level. On the other hand, in the past the government has
encouraged and subsidized savings in all types of bonds, which in Austria are
traditionally issued by local and federal governments, the large banks and also
public utility companies, but only rarely by production firms. Thus it has been
argued that saving in stocks of industrial firms has been "discriminated against",
even though in 1968 the corporate income tax rate on dividends was halved. Such
measures in Austria do have an impact on dividend distribution, but their effect
is rather short-run. The ratio of dividend payouts in relation to (nominal or real)
equity profit (of all Industry corporations) shows this effect clearly for the years
1968 and 1969. (Table 12). The strong variation of this ratio for the period
afterwards (standard deviation 4.2 for 1968-1977, vs. only 1.1 for 1956-1967)
combines the effect of a very constant stream of dividends (especially in relation
to nominal capital), with strong movements in equity profit. It has been noted
elsewhere (Bayer 1980a) that Austrian stockholders (especially those majority
owners who hold on to their stocks) are rather interested in a bond-like return on
their stocks than in dividend ratios which fluctuate with profitability. Thus the
dividend payout decisions by the management are less influenced by economic
reasoning than by the wish to receive as constant a flow of dividends as possible.
In this way saving in common stocks loses its specific appeal for the
Table 12
Dividend Payout Ratios in Austrian Industry
Dividends Dividends in Relation to
Equity II Equity II Profits
in 1.000 S nominal real nominal real
1955 231.549 . . .
1956 381.402 1,60 1,26 9,19 10,33
1957 409.194 1,56 1,21 7,99 8,76
1958 378.061 1,31 1,00 7,84 8,40
1959 410.911 1,27 0,97 7,72 8,46
1960 574.011 1,61 1,21 7,69 8,46
1961 536.735 1,38 1,03 9,67 11,14
1962 468.663 1,12 0,83 8,09 9,26
1963 542.122 1,22 0,89 9,17 10,56
1964 572.764 1,20 0,88 8,35 9,73
1965 537.819 1,08 0,77 8,12 9,79
1966 512.795 0,98 0,70 8,66 10,40
1967 452.566 0,82 0,61 9,48 11,84
1968 693.381 1,21 0,89 14,88 19,58
1969 848.847 1,44 1,01 12,86 16,25
1970 926.241 1,50 1,01 9,76 12,16
1971 989.349 1,51 0,97 10,58 13,70
1972 988.034 1,41 0,91 8,64 10,37
1973 732.050 0,95 0,61 6,58 8,54
1974 1 185.678 1,44 0,85 11,68 23,45
1975 849.727 0,97 0,57 9,54 14,30
1976 983.775 1,05 0,66 8,96 11,31
1977 822.022 0,84 0,55 8,85 11,68
1978 1 027.619 1,01 0,70 14,81 18,96
Equity II: Equity Capital exclusive of Social Capital
nominal: without inflation accounting
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average investor who would prefer a riskier, but on average higher-yielding
investment to a low-yielding risk-free bond. This peculiarity of the Austrian
industrial stock "market" has resulted in a nearly continuous loss in implicit
share values since the boom year 1961. Since then the ratio of market value to
nominal value of industry stock has fallen by 62%. In this way, for the reasons
cited above, it is an illusion to think that the capital market can provide the
necessary risk-capital for further restructuring and expansion of Austrian
industry.
3.4.2 Yields and Costs of Capital
Usually yields and costs of capital are compared by contrasting rates of return
on capital invested (as calculated here) with the rates of return on financial
assets (firms' stocks and bonds). For the reasons; mentioned in the previous
section such a comparison yields results of low value for Austria, since no
"market" exists that would set stock prices reflecting the demand and supply of
shares. The traded volume is too low for that purpose.
To a large extent Austrian industrial firms are self-financed. The very substan-
tial promotion of self-financing by means of accelerated depreciation allowances
(which in Austria is more highly developed than in most other Western countries
(Lehner)) has led to a heavy reliance of Austrian firms to finance large parts of
their investment by plowing back profits. Thus when calculated on a current cost
basis, the debt-equity ratio of Austrian firms is relatively low and has increased
only slightly until the early seventies. Since then, however, it has risen quite
Figure 6
CAPITAL YIELDS AND COSTS
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substantially, especially since the profit squeeze during the crisis of 1974/75 has
made use of accelerated depreciation scarcer, because profits were not high
enough. Thus debt financing has assumed a more prominent role. Depending on
the definition (whether or not provisions for "social capital" are included) the
debt-equity ratio between 1973 and 1978 increased from 0,59 (resp. 0,63
inclusive of social capital) to 0,82 (1,06) after it had remained practically
constant (with small fluctuations) between 1956 and 1973. Also during that time
the interest-burden increased significantly, because in addition to a higher
debt-ratio nominal and real interest rates reached a new high. In relation to
operating surplus (inclusive of interest) interest payments rose from 31% in 1973
to 49% in 1978. Since 1978 interest rates have increased even more due to
factors external to Austrian economic policy influences. This has resulted to a.
very heavy burden of the external debt.
One very rough approximation of the cost of capital to Austrian firms is given by
the rate on long-term government and industrial bonds, deflated by the consumer
price index. This rate is significant, because on the one hand it approximates the
opportunity costs of potential financiers of industry (only incompletely though,
because for a number of years acquisition of such bonds was subsidized), on the
other hand movements in this rate (if not the actual level) are closely related to
costs of bank loans. Again the approximation is incomplete, since for a vast
array of industry loans investment premiums and interest subsidies are available,
which have not been taken into account in this comparison. Other (real) capital
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cost indicators are reflected in the interest rates paid by the firms for loans.
Unfortunately, the data published in the balance sheets to not separate
interest-bearing liabilities from others. Thus two series were constructed which
mark a lower and an upper limit to the actual interest burden borne by the
corporate sector: the lower one defined as interest payments in relation to all
liabilities, the upper limit by interest payments in relation to overdrafts and
bank liabilities (table 13). Both series exhibit a marked upward trend, which is
steeper for the latter definition.
Comparisons between costs and yields show that in the long run (at least up to
1977) yields (rate of return) were quite significantly higher than costs (bond rate;
see Fig.5).
The long-run average real net rate of return on total industrial capital (after
direct) taxes amounts to 3,9%, the real rate of interest on newly issued
government bonds to only 3,0%. The difference is especially large during the
years of highest inflation (1972-75) when the bond rate was respectively 0,9%,
0,2%, -0,5% and 1,1%, while during those years the rate of return was 4,5%,
3,5%, 3,3% and 2,2%.
The difference between investment in productive assets (industry) and financial
assets (bonds) become even more striking when real rates of return on equity
capital are calculated. Depending on the exact definition, these latter amount in
the long run to between 4,9% and 5,5% after taxes, depending on whether social
capital is included or not. (Fig.5, table 13).
Table 13
Indicators of Real Costs of Carital
to Austrian Firms
Return to
Investors
22,8
- 27,0
- 6,9
- 1,6
- 2,0
- 2,5
- 4,8
3,3
15,4
16,3
- 6,5
25,2
8,5
0,6
8,2
4,4
- 10,3
5,24
Interest
Burden 1
3,9
4,2
4,7
4,6
4,3
4,6
4,3
4,2
4,3
5,2
5,2
4,8
4,8
5,0
Interest
Burden 2
8,2
9,2
10,0
10,0
9,3
10,2
9,5
10,9
12,9
15,24
16,6
16,5
16,1
16,8
Real Bond
Rate
3,2
4,8
4,4
3,3
2,9
0,9
0,4
- 0,2
1,1
1,5
3,2
4,6
Return to Investors: Dividends plus Capital Gains in Relation to Market
Value of Stocks
Interest Burden 1: Interest Payments in Relation to All Liabilities
Interest Burden 2: Interest Payments in Relation to Bank Liabilities
Real Bond Fate: Real Rate of Return on Government and Private Bonds
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
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These differences between investment in productive and in financial assets as
shown here cannot be interpreted as representing risk premiums. This would only
be true if one compared the real rate of return for an individual company, or a
small group of companies with the bond rate. Thus the differences in the rates on
financial vs. productive assets can be interpreted as "real" superiority of one
investment type over another.
The period-to-period comparisons show that from the midfifties to the end of the
sixties this difference decreased substantially, then recovered again to its
highest value during the early seventies and was reduced again for the past few
years. There are indications, however, that since 1977 rates of return on
financial assets have been higher than those on productive ones.
The data presented here indicate stronghly that capital costs relative to profits
have remained quite constant throughout the fifties, increated drastically
throughout the sixties, fell during the expansion phase of the early seventies and
have risen considerably again since 1974 (Fig.5).
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Footnotes:
1) A recent study by the author (Aiginger-Bayer, Dynamik) shows some evidence
that during the seventies smaller firms were more profitable than larger ones.
2) See on this point the discussion in the Spring 1976 issue of the Journal of
Business Finance and Accounting, vol.3, no 1, Oxford, for the British debate, or
Business Week, Oct.15, 1979 or June 16, 1980 on the U.S.debate.
3) E.g. D.Schneider 1968.
4) Ch.Kennedy, p. 6 2 ., Th.Weisskopf, p.349 make this distinction.
5) See K.Bayer, Inflation Accounting, bibliography and the papers by the author
quoted have.
6) K.Bayer, Inflation Accounting, p. 4 6 .
7) See e.g. R.Coen 1975 and the literature cited there.
8) Hill 1979 and Landskroner 1979, among many others, deal extensively with this
point.
9) Technically, the analysis was carried out by differentiating equation (1) over
time, i.e. by transforming all variables into exponential rates
- 33-
r= a+b+c
where ) dx (t) /dtX (t)
the analysis also was carried out between cycles and within each cycle, as well
as for the three individual phases of the cycle. The exponential growth rates for
the total period were calculated by regressing the logarithm of each variable on
time. The growth rates of the variables between cycles were estimated by a
two-stage process: first, the geometric mean of the variable within each cycle
was determined and attributed to the mid-point of the cycle then the growth
rate between cycles was approximated by the formula
k (t 2 /t 1 ) = n (t 2  1
t -t
where t is measured in years. Of course, quarterly analysis would be preferable,
especially with relation to the cyclical behavior, but not quarterly data are
available.
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